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This paper presents the first comparative analysis of the decline in collective bargaining 
in two European countries where that decline has been among the most pronounced. 
Using establishment-level data and a common model, we present decompositions of 
changes in collective bargaining in the private sector in Germany and Britain over the 
period 1998-2004. In both countries, within-effects dominate compositional changes as 
the source of the recent decline in unionism. Overall, the decline in collective bargaining 
is more pronounced in Britain than in Germany, thus continuing a trend apparent since 
the 1980s. Although establishment characteristics differ markedly across the two 
countries, assuming counterfactual values of these characteristics makes little difference 











  I   INTRODUCTION   
Recent years have witnessed a decline in unionism in Western Europe (Blanchflower, 
2007; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999; Visser, 2003, 2006). The decline has not been 
uniform but has instead been concentrated in the larger countries, particularly Britain, 
Germany, and Italy. We take advantage of unique comparable establishment data to 
examine developments in two of these countries, Germany and Britain.  
We contribute to the existing literature which has focused almost entirely on 
union density using household data, by exploring factors behind the demise of private 
sector unionization at establishment level.
1 We deploy a common model of the 
determinants of collective bargaining and undertake a shift-share analysis of observed 
changes in the outcome indicators both across time and vertically (i.e. at a single point in 
time). 
The goal is to determine the contribution of compositional factors on the one hand 
and behavioural or within-group factors on the other to the decline in unionization. 
Although similar such decompositions based on union density have been undertaken for 
individual countries, ours is the first such comparative exercise. And apart from one other 
(single-country) study it is the first to consider union recognition rates at establishment 
level rather than on aggregations based on the union status of individuals. Moreover, 
unlike that study it covers a larger slice of the labour force, namely establishments with 






II   BACKGROUND 
The decline in unionism in Britain long preceded our sample period. Writing at the 
beginning of this decade, and reflecting on the findings of a study tracking employment 
relations over the previous two decades, Millward et al. (2000, p. 234) commented: “The 
system of collective relations, based on the shared values of the legitimacy of 
representation by independent trade unions and of joint regulation, crumbled … to such 
an extent that it no longer represents a dominant model.”  Between 1979 and 1999 the 
percentage of employees who were union members fell from 73 percent to 28 percent; in 
1980 about 70 percent of establishments recognized unions for collective bargaining 
purposes, declining to less than 45 percent by the mid-1990s (Machin, 2000). These 
results were driven by developments in the private sector, and above all in 
manufacturing.  
Commentators were now to refer to unions as “hollow shells” (Hyman, 1997; 
Brown et al., 1998; Millward et al., 2000), their parlous state severely affecting their 
ability to service current members’ interests, let alone organize parts of the non-union 
sector (Willman and Bryson, 2009).  The tendency was for new establishments and new 
entrants to the labour force to be ‘born’ non-union (Machin, 2000; Willman et al., 2007), 
resulting in a rise in the proportion of all employees in the labour force who had never 
been union members (Bryson and Gomez, 2005).  
In Britain, there is no legal impediment to a plant engaging in both sectoral and 
firm or establishment bargaining. In practice, by the start of our sample period, sectoral 
bargaining was already a spent force outside of the public sector (Brown et al., 2009, p. 
34). The demise of national pay bargaining in Britain reflects a decision made by 
employers to move away from a scenario in which sectoral bargaining set a floor to pay,  
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effectively taking wages out of competition, to a situation in which employers are 
actively competing on the basis of labour costs. 
Unlike Britain, in Germany firm-level and sectoral-level bargaining are mutually 
exclusive: they cannot co-exist at establishment level. Firm level bargaining may be used 
by larger firms able to absorb the fixed costs of a dedicated system. Nevertheless, the 
majority of large firms simply subscribe to the sectoral bargaining system. Smaller firms 
may use sectoral bargaining to benchmark their pay to the standard set by (most) others 
(Schmidt and Dworschak, 2006). Necessarily, this rationale breaks down if sectoral pay 
is set by large firm ‘leaders’ – a form of pattern bargaining – setting wages which only 
they can afford. This may precipitate exit from sectoral agreements to ‘no agreement’ by 
smaller and less well placed firms. 
Historically, sectoral bargaining (strictly, regional industry-wide bargaining) has 
been the key form of collective bargaining in Germany, covering some 90 percent of all 
employees.  As Schnabel et al. (2006, p. 168) note, things first began to change in the 
early 1970s with the emergence of what they term “qualitative bargaining policy,” 
namely sectoral agreements that sought to accommodate improvements in working life 
and the protection of employees against dislocations caused by rationalization and 
technical change. Such provisions were to be implemented at local level. Thence, in the 
1990s, under the pressures of globalization, high unemployment, and unification, the 
system of collective bargaining began to erode. The manifestations of this erosion 
included a rising trend of firm resignations from employers’ associations (Silvia and 
Schroeder, 2007), a rapid decline in union density (Addison et al., 2007), and shrinking 
collective bargaining coverage (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003).  Moreover, the coverage of  
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that other pillar of the German dual system – the works council – was also subject to 
some erosion (Hassel, 1999). In response to these challenges, German collective 
bargaining was decentralizing. One aspect of this development was the growth in 
company agreements as many firms dropped out of the centralized system. Another was 
the growth of decentralization in sectoral agreements – first through the device of 
‘opening clauses’ that allowed firms more flexibility via locally negotiated adjustments to 
centrally agreed working time and wages, and latterly through other contractual 
innovations including ‘pacts for employment and competitiveness’ (Addison et al., 
2009). Such organized decentralization may have slowed the flight from sectoral 
collective bargaining to firm-level bargaining and individual bargaining. Nevertheless, 
from 1990 to 1997 the number of company agreements rose from 2,100 to 3,300 in 
western Germany (and from 2,700 to 5,000 in the whole of Germany) while the 
percentage of employees in western Germany who were covered by collective (sectoral) 
agreements fell from 83.1 (72.2) percent in 1995 to 75 (67.8) percent in 1998 (Hassel, 
1999).   
The decline in union density has been fairly extensively charted in Britain, 
somewhat less so in Germany given the longer-standing decline in the former nation. One 
early hallmark of the British analysis was the attempt to decompose the decline in 
unionization into its constituent parts. For the decade of the 1980s (strictly 1983-1989) 
Green (1992) concludes that the combined effect of compositional factors to the observed 
decline in private-sector union density from 49.6 to 38.6 percent was 30 percent, which is 
taken by the author to be an upper-bound estimate since compositional changes are not 
independent of public policy or macroeconomic conditions.   
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In investigating the 16 percentage point fall in private-sector union density over 
the period 1983-2001, Bryson and Gomez (2005) find that just one percentage point is 
explained by an increase in the number of workers who ceased being union members.
 The 
remainder is due to the rise in the percentage of employees who never join a trade union 
(“never-members”).
2 Overall, the authors conclude that 60 percent of the 20 percentage 
point increase in never-membership over the period was due to compositional factors.  
We are only aware of one British study that uses plant level data to identify the 
contribution of compositional change of unionization rates. (The others investigate union 
density based on the union status of individuals.) Blanchflower and Bryson (2009) show 
that the share of establishments recognizing one or more unions for collective bargaining 
(viz. the union recognition rate) fell from 49.5 percent in 1980 to 22.3 percent in 2004 
among all private-sector establishments with 25 or more employee. Applying the 
predictions of the 1980 model to the 2004 sample, they conclude that behavioral factors 
(largely employer choices) dominated any effects arising from changes in the structure of 
the establishment since no less than 68 percent (18.5 percentage points) of the decline in 
union recognition was the result of within-group changes. 
The early literature on the determinants of union density in Germany indicated 
that the propensity for union membership had not changed materially over time (see, inter 
al., the literature review in Fitzenberger et al., 2006). However, two more recent 
contributions challenge the implication that the decline in union density in that country 
has mainly been driven by composition effects. Using data from three cross sections of 
the ALLBUS general survey from 1980 to 2004 in western Germany and from 1992 to 
2004 in eastern Germany, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) find changes in the composition  
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of the sample of employees in western Germany explain just 0.16 percentage points (or 
1.4 percent) of the 11.49 percentage point decline in the share of employees that were 
union members over the sample period (although the compositional effects are larger 
when taking the results for 2004 as the reference group). The east German results pointed 
to even smaller compositional effects.  
A study by Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang (2006) using data from six (four) 
waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel for western (eastern) Germany estimates 
individual membership functions via a correlated random effects probit model. The 
characteristics’ effects explain under one-third of the 6 percentage point decline in union 
density in western Germany between 1993 and 2003, and under one-fifth of the 19 
percentage point decline in eastern Germany over the same interval. The role of 
characteristics versus coefficients is also evaluated in terms of east-west comparisons at 
the start and end of the period. In 1993 when union density in the east exceeded that in 
the west by 11 percentage points, the composition of the west German labor force 
actually favored higher density (by 5 percentage points). Accordingly, the higher density 
in the east resulted from a 16 percentage point difference in coefficients; that is, for given 
characteristics, east Germans were at this time more strongly unionized than their western 
counterparts. But by 2003 union density in the east had fallen some 2 percentage points 
below that of the west. Since the composition of the labour force in the west still favored 
higher density, it follows that the coefficients effect had become more similar in the two 
halves of the country. On balance, therefore, the emerging consensus of the recent 
German literature is that changes in the composition of the workforce have played a 
minor role in the decline in union density.   
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In what follows, we analyze the decline in private-sector collective bargaining in 
Britain and Germany. Our unit of analysis throughout is the establishment. Drawing on 
the German Institute for Employment Research Establishment (IAB) Panel and the 
British Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS), we offer the first unified 
comparative analysis of the erosion of collective bargaining coverage to complement the 
recent disparate studies of union density in each country. 
 
III   DATA 
The German data are taken from the private sector establishments in the IAB 
Establishment Panel. The Panel is based on a stratified random sample of   
establishments
3 – the strata are currently defined over 17 industries and 10 employment 
size categories – from the population of all establishments with at least one employee 
covered by social insurance (see Fischer et al., 2009). The basis for sampling is the 
Federal Employment Agency establishment file, containing some 2 million 
establishments. The panel was set up in 1993 for western Germany so as to provide a 
representative information system permitting continuous analysis of labour demand. It 
was applied to eastern Germany in 1996 and is therefore now nationwide in its coverage. 
From the outset the IAB Establishment panel was intended as a longitudinal survey, so 
that a large majority of the same plants are interviewed each year. To correct for panel 
mortality, exits, and newly founded firms, however, the data are augmented regularly. 
Taken in conjunction with other extension samples (to allow regional analysis at the 
federal state level), the panel has grown over time and now the number of plants surveyed 
is around 16,000 units.  
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The survey is generally carried out in the form of face-to-face interviews, with 
written postal surveys also being undertaken in some federal states. The overall response 
rate to the surveys has varied between 63 percent and 73 percent. It is lower for first-time 
respondents and for the written surveys. But the response rate for the orally-interviewed 
continuing establishments is stable at between 81 percent and 84 percent. (On the cross-
sectional and longitudinal weighting procedures, see Fischer et al., 2009.) 
We restrict the German data to the 1998 and 2004 cross-sections of the IAB 
Establishment Panel to maintain correspondence with the two British establishment 
surveys. The German raw sample contains a total of some 25,451 observations: 9,762 
from the 1998 survey and 15,689 observations from the 2004 survey.  
The British data are taken from the 1998 and 2004 WERS. These are cross-
sectional surveys based on stratified random samples of establishments taken from the 
Inter-Departmental Business Register which contains the population of establishments in 
Britain that are subject to VAT or maintain tax records for the purpose of paying 
employees. The survey covers all sectors of the British economy with the exception of 
mining and quarrying; agriculture, hunting, and forestry; fishing; private households with 
employed persons; and extraterritorial bodies. However, for the purposes of the present 
exercise, we confine our attention to private-sector establishments. The unit of analysis is 
the establishment, namely a place of employment at a single address or site. For the 1998 
WERS the population was all establishments with at least 10 employees. For the 2004 
WERS, however, the employment threshold was lowered to 5 employees. We retain the 
10 employee threshold to ensure comparability across the two British surveys. (Filters 
were applied to the German data to provide a comparable sample, including the public  
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sector and size restrictions.) The final estimation sample for Britain is 2,991, comprising 
1,502 establishments in 1998 and 1,489 in 2004. This number falls to 2,920 when 
distinguishing bargaining levels due to some missing observations. 
All independent variables are collected in face-to-face interviews with the senior 
manager responsible for employment relations on a day-to-day basis. The response rate 
was 80 percent in 1998 and 65 percent in 2004. As in the German case, we apply sample 
weights so that our analyses are nationally representative of private-sector establishments 
in Britain with 10 or more employees (For full details of the two surveys, see Chaplin et 
al., 2005; Airey et al., 1999.)  
Most of the variables used in our analysis are self-explanatory, but two of them 
deserve some additional explanation. First, the definition of a ‘leading region’ in Britain 
is London and the South East of England, whereas for Germany it is simply western 
Germany. Second, the ‘proportion of skilled workers’ in Britain is based on the 
proportion of employees in the establishment in skilled occupations, defined as those in 
managerial, professional, technical, clerical, and skilled craft occupations. For Germany, 
the definition comprises skilled manual workers together with employees in jobs 
requiring a vocational qualification or comparable training on the job or relevant 
professional experience, and those in jobs requiring a university degree or higher 
education.  
The German establishment panel identifies whether or not the establishment is 
bound by an industry-wide agreement, a company agreement concluded by the 
establishment and the trade unions, or no collective agreement at all.
4 The British data 
contain two measures of collective bargaining. The first is based on whether there is an  
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agreement, be it at establishment, organization or sectoral level, to recognize one or more 
unions to bargain over terms and conditions for employees at the surveyed 
establishment.
5 This recognition measure is that which has traditionally been used in 
analyses of establishment unionization in Britain, going back to the first establishment 
survey in 1980 (Blanchflower et al., Forth, 2007).  However, in the 1998 and 2004 
surveys new questions were introduced inquiring of the establishment manager how pay 
was set for each single-digit occupational group in the establishment. Specifically, for 
each occupation present the manager was now asked: “Which of the following statements 
most closely characterizes the way that pay is set for [occupational group]?” The first 
three pre-coded answers are: “collective bargaining for more than one employer (e.g. 
industry-wide agreement)”; “collective bargaining at an organization level”; and 
“collective bargaining at this establishment.” From this information we construct 
variables identifying any collective bargaining, any sectoral-level collective bargaining, 
and any firm-level (establishment or organization) collective bargaining.   
It is notable that the incidence of collective bargaining is higher using the former 
‘union recognition’ measure than the alternative ‘any collective agreement’ derived from 
the occupation-specific tranche of questions (see Table 1 below). This may be because 
the latter is interpreted by respondents as active collective bargaining during the year of 
the survey, whereas union recognition may also include establishments where an 
agreement to negotiate over wages is in place, but where no actual bargaining occurred in 
the survey year, either because the pay agreement is not due for renewal in that year or 
because the agreement is dormant (Kersley et al., 2006; Millward et al., 2000). To obtain 
a complete picture, although our focus will be upon the conventional union recognition  
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variable, we shall supplement this discussion with an analysis of collective agreements of 
any type so as to consider not only the correlates of active bargaining but also how these 
may differ by bargaining gradient (i.e. industry-level versus establishment/organization-
level agreements). 
  
IV   MODELING 
Our study of union decline between, say, t0 and t 1 is based on the standard Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition (or multivariate shift-share analysis) in which the outcome of 
interest  Y (here the collective bargaining measure relevant to the establishment) is 
conditional on a set of observed characteristics X.  Further, assuming that Y is generated 
by a linear additively separable function in observable and unobservable characterisitics, 
we have (for either country, Germany or Britain) 
11 1 1 tt t t YX Bu =+ ,                                                           (1) 
and 
00 0 0 tt t t YX Bu =+ .                      (2) 
 
The aggregate change in the outcome variable, Δt, is therefore (assuming that  
11 (| )0 tt Eu X =  and
01 (| ) 0 tt Eu X = ) 
101 10 0 ttt t tt t yyx bx b Δ= − = − ,                     ( 3 )  
where y denotes the mean outcome, x the mean vector of characteristics, and b the 
corresponding coefficient estimates, obtained from equations (1) and (2) in separate OLS 
regressions.   
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After adding and subtracting xtbt (i.e. the counterfactual) from (3), we have the 
two-component decomposition 
10 01 10 ()() tt t t t t t x xb xb b Δ= − + − ,                 ( 4 )  
where the first term on the right-hand-side gives the ‘explained’ component; that is, the 
part of the observed change allocated to differences in observable characteristics (the 
between or compositional effect) while the second gives the ‘unexplained’ component  
(the within or behavioural effect), namely the change in the outcome occasioned by   
differences in propensities from period t0 to period t1.
6  
We are also interested in analyzing differences in outcomes across countries at a 
given point in time. In this case, and now denoting countries by subscripts (1 for 
Germany and 0 for Britain), the overall mean gap between the two countries Δj  at a  
certain moment in time (i.e. 1998 or 2004) is given by  
10 10 01 1 0 ()() j yy xx bx bb Δ= − = − + − ,                                                       (5) 
where y  and x again denote mean vectors for the dependent and independent variables 
respectively and b are the coefficient estimates obtained from the separate OLS 
regressions:  11 1 1 YX Bu =+  and  00 0 0 YX B u = + . 
 To keep our implementation as simple as possible, we rely on linear estimates for 
our decompositions, although as a robustness check we shall also report parenthetically 
on some nonlinear estimates.  
By way of summary, our outcome variable is whether or not the establishment is 
covered by a collective agreement (or, principally, a recognized union for Britain). We 
shall also report the cases where the dependent variable measures the presence of a firm 
or sectoral agreement. Our explanatory variables, common to the two countries, are  
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industry and establishment size dummies, measures of workforce composition, (skill, 
gender, and working time status), foreign ownership, single versus multi-site firm status, 
establishment age, and region.  
 
V   FINDINGS 
Table 1 presents the means of the variables in 1998 and 2004 and the corresponding 
percentage point/percentage changes in these values over the period. The first five rows 
of the table contain the outcome measures, while the establishment characteristics are 
reported in the remaining rows. Throughout the means are computed using sample 
weights so as to guarantee their representativeness with respect to the underlying 
population. 
(Table 1 near here) 
The incidence of collective bargaining has declined markedly in Britain and 
Germany (row 1), the percentage point decline being twice as large for union recognition 
in Britain as it is for collective bargaining in Germany (11.4 versus 5.8 percentage 
points). The rate of decline – measured as a percentage of collective bargaining in the 
base period – is one-and-a-half times faster in Britain (viz. 30 percent compared with 
around 20 percent in Germany). Nevertheless, levels of collective bargaining coverage 
remain considerably higher in Germany than in Britain throughout the period. In the 
British case, although the incidence of (any) collective bargaining coverage is lower than 
union recognition, its recorded absolute and relative decline is higher, a finding consistent 
with  a further ‘hollowing out’ of union bargaining in Britain. 
Sectoral bargaining predominates in Germany: multiemployer agreements are ten 
times more common than firm agreements. In Britain, on the other hand, sectoral  
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bargaining appears to be an endangered species – even before the start of our sample 
period. Firm-level collective bargaining is considerably more stable over time than 
sectoral bargaining for both countries and its incidence is higher in Britain than in 
Germany throughout the period. Latterly, it seems that German employers’ aversion to 
collective bargaining is not confined to sectoral bargaining since firm-level bargaining is 
also in decline.  
Table 1 also reviews the other establishment characteristics for both countries that 
we use in our shift-share analyses. The distribution of establishment size (as measured by 
number of employees), establishment age, and workforce composition (skill, gender, and 
hours of work), seem to be quite similar across countries. Differences are apparent with 
respect to foreign ownership (twice as high in Britain), and industry composition (e.g. the 
preponderance of the financial sector and hotels and restaurants in Britain, and the greater 
importance of construction in Germany). There are also sizeable differences in the 
importance of other business and services and community services in the two countries. 
However, the biggest difference between Britain and Germany relates to single versus 
multiple establishment firms: in Germany  single establishment firms (‘independent’ 
companies) constitute four-fifths of the private sector, as compared with just two-fifths in 
Britain.  
(Table 2 near here) 
Table 2 presents the incidence of collective bargaining and union recognition in 
Germany and Britain by establishment characteristics. In Germany, collective bargaining 
incidence is above average in sectors like utilities, construction, hotels and restaurants, 
transport and communications, and financial services. It is below average in  
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manufacturing, health, education, and other business services. In Britain, utilities, 
education, health, and transport and communications, education, and health exceed the 
country mean for recognition. Looking across countries, coverage rates diverge least in 
utilities, education, and health. For the remaining sectors, coverage is much higher in 
Germany, often dramatically so. The decline in coverage in Germany is concentrated 
among establishments with 200 or fewer employees, while in Britain it is concentrated in 
establishments with 10-20 and 201-999 employees. In both countries the decline in the 
incidence of collective bargaining and union recognition is to a large extent across-the-
board, even if some marked ‘individual’ differences are apparent.  
(Table 3 near here) 
The basis of the subsequent decomposition exercise is Table 3, which presents our 
linear probability estimates of a establishment having a collective agreement of any type 
(Germany) or a recognized union (Britain).
7 The first column of the table pools the 
German data for 1998 and 2004. It  shows that, all else constant, only the other business 
services, education, and health sectors evince a statistically significant lower probability 
of coverage than manufacturing (the reference sector), while the role of establishment 
size is well-determined (the larger the establishment, the greater the probability of 
coverage). The fourth column repeats the same pooled analysis for Britain. It indicates 
that utilities have a higher probability of union recognition than manufacturing, whereas 
wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, other business services, and community 
services all have a lower probability. These results hold, with a few exceptions, for the 
separate year regressions given in the second/third and fifth/sixth columns for Germany 
and Britain, respectively. Further, foreign ownership, single establishment status and  
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establishment ‘youth’ decrease the probability of being covered, especially in Germany. 
However, no particular pattern emerges from workforce composition.  
The coefficient estimate for the time dummy (2004) of –0.124 for Germany in the 
first column of the table is a little higher than the observed decline of 11.4 percentage 
points (earlier reported in Table 1), suggesting that the contribution of the compositional 
effect to change is likely to be low. Put differently, holding characteristics constant, the 
coefficient estimate for the time dummy implies a 12.4 percentage point decline, 
implying that the within-effect will tend to dominate. 
In the case of Britain, the coefficient of the time dummy (–0.056) also mirrors 
quite closely the observed raw decline of 5.8 percentage points (see Table 1) in the union 
recognition measure over the period 1998-2004. As in the case of Germany, therefore, the 
compositional effect for Britain is expected to be low as well.  
Results for pooled country data are provided in the last three columns of Table 3. 
In these pooled analyses we reweighted the data so that the British and German 
establishments contributed an identical number of weighted observations to the analysis. 
The coefficient estimate for the German establishment variable gives the increased 
probability of an establishment in that country being covered by a collective agreement of 
any type relative to Britain, having controlled for observable establishment 
characteristics. In the regression for 1998, for example, this coefficient is equal to 0.453 
which is slightly higher than the observed 1998 gap between the two countries of 0.422 
(again consult Table 1). For 2004, as can be seen from the final column of the table, the 
disparity is larger: 0.422 rather than 0.366 (Table 1). (Note that the coefficient estimate 
for the German establishment variable in the seventh column of the table is roughly the  
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average of the 1998 and 2004 coefficients reported in the separate regressions.) The 
implication is that there is something about being in Germany, rather than Britain, and 
not accounted for by characteristics at establishment-level that markedly elevate the 
probability of collective bargaining coverage. This latter result will of course come as no 
surprise to proponents of the varieties-of-capitalism school who tend to emphasize the 
role of  macro-institutional features and political economy considerations.  Finally, the 
time dummy of –8.1 percent very roughly approximates the observed decline in the 
German-British union representation gap of 5.6 percentage points earlier shown in Table 
1. 
(Table 4a near here) 
   Our multivariate shift-share analysis is summarized in panels (a) through (d) of 
Table 4a.  The estimates are derived from the decomposition exercise described in 
equation (4) by type of collective bargaining coverage. Rows (5)-(8) of each panel give 
the proportions of the observed change in outcome that are due to the compositional 
effect and the within-effect, respectively. The compositional effect is computed assuming 
two distinct base-year (1998 and 2004) propensities as reference categories, while the 
within-effect is, by definition, simply the difference between the actual change and the 
compositional effect. These effects are computed for Germany and Britain from separate 
regressions. All estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels.  
The most striking feature of the table is the magnitude of the within-effect 
throughout. In the case of Germany, for example, had the propensities (1998 coefficients) 
assumed the same level in 1998 and 2004, collective bargaining coverage would have 
been virtually unchanged over the sample period (63.7 percent rather than 62.5 percent).  
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Given that the observed coverage rate in 2004 is 51.1 percent, it follows that the decline 
in collective bargaining coverage in Germany is due in its entirety to a change in 
behaviour. If anything, changes in the characteristics of establishments over the period 
were actually favourable toward collective bargaining as the within effect is 110.9 
percent in row (6). Using the 2004 coefficients, the within-effect would be slightly 
smaller at 105.9 percent, row (8). As shown in panels (c) and (d), these results also hold 
for the cases of sectoral bargaining and firm-level agreements, respectively.  
In Britain, the within-effect is also the major driving force in explaining the 
change in union recognition over time, accounting for nearly 80 percent of the observed 
decline in the case where 1998 coefficients are the reference category. Using 2004 
coefficients yields even a larger within-effect. In the case of panels (b) through (d), that 
now refer to union coverage – our secondary measure of collective bargaining in Britain 
– the small magnitudes involved (just 10.6 percent of plants were covered by any type of 
collective bargaining in 2004 compared with 16.9 percent in 1998) imply a very large 
effect even if the underlying changes are small. Nevertheless, for this measure the within-
effect plays an even larger role than for union recognition. 
We note parenthetically that these results are robust to model specification. In 
Appendix Table 1, we show the results of a decomposition exercise in which a ‘full’ 
model is specified for each country and are again able to point to the dominance of the 
within-effect, albeit with a fairly pronounced tendency for the contribution of 
compositional change to be higher in the case of Britain in the first and second columns.
8  
Neither do our results seem to be sensitive to weighting. In Appendix Table 2 we 
replicate Table 4a with unweighted data. Despite the fact that the unweighted figures on  
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collective agreement coverage and union recognition are obviously higher – large 
establishments are over-represented in both surveys and size and coverage are positively 
correlated – the share of the within-effect is pretty much the same: 108.6 percent for 
Germany and 78.2 percent for Britain in the unweighted case, and 110.9 percent and 78.2 
percent in the weighted case (see Table 4a), respectively. Accordingly the primacy of the 
within-effect is undisturbed if we work with unweighted data. 
  Finally, we checked whether there was any particular variable (or set of variables) 
driving the results of our decomposition. A more ‘detailed’ decomposition was 
implemented using the procedure made available by Jann (2008), and is remitted to 
Appendix Tables 3a and 3b.
9 We also thought it worthwhile to examine the sensitivity of 
this particular decomposition exercise to the choice of the reference category. To this 
end, the results are grouped into three distinct columns, depending on whether the base-
year coefficients are 1998, 2004, or from the pooled (1998 and 2004) sample, 
respectively. As is apparent from these tables, which focus on the dependent variable 'any 
collective bargaining', there are no particularly striking results at this level of 
disaggregation. Rather, it is the case that some compositional effects pull in opposite 
directions, cancelling each other out to some extent. Further, none of the individual 
effects is sufficiently marked to merit special attention here, not least because all of the 
effects are individually rather small quantitatively.  
(Table 4b near here) 
We have noted that the gap in collective bargaining coverage between Germany 
and Britain is roughly 40 percentage points and that this gap does not change very much 
over the period. We can use our estimates to answer the question: had British  
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establishments been endowed with the German characteristics would they have had the 
(high) German collective bargaining coverage? Table 4b  shows the results of this 
exercise, using either the German or the British propensities as reference categories. We 
find that differences in the distribution of observable establishment characteristics across 
Germany and Britain account for around one-tenth of the disparity in collective 
bargaining across countries. Accordingly, when using German propensities, roughly 90 
percent is due to differences in the betas for each characteristic in the two countries. 
Despite differences in magnitude when using British rather than German coefficients, the 
results in rows (7) and (8) indicate that the within-effect continues to dominate. This 
‘unexplained’ component, often attributed to discrimination in the gender wage gap 
literature, may here be attributable to employer tastes for union wage setting, due in part 
to very different historical, political and industrial relations institutions in Germany 
relative to Britain. 
These results also hold up rather well in the case of any type of collective 
agreement (shown in panel (b)) or sectoral agreements (panel (c)). Interestingly, the small 
German-British gap in firm-level bargaining (panel (d)) shows an opposite pattern: the 
compositional effect is dominant in both 1998 and 2004. Thus, holding establishment 
characteristics constant, the two countries have roughly the same propensities to engage 
in firm-level agreements.
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(Table 5 near here) 
  Finally, Table 5 presents a counterfactual exercise in which the German (British) 
coefficients or propensities are applied to British (German) characteristics in each of the 
two sample years, 1998 and 2004. The exercise is carried out for all selected outcome  
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variables, and the most interesting finding, as shown in the first two columns of the table, 
is that Britain would very much resemble Germany if the British establishments recorded 
the same ‘behaviour’  as their German counterparts. In  1998, for example, the gap 
between the observed collective bargaining coverage in Germany and the counterfactual 
coverage rate would be a striking 3.3 percentage points (or 62.5–59.2); whereas in 2004 it 
would be 4.2 percentage points (51.1 – 46.9). Over time, the percentage point change of –
12.3 would, in turn, broadly mimic the observed percentage point change of –11.4 (Table 
4a, panel (a)). 
  Applying the British propensities to Germany establishments produces a British-
like situation, although with less ‘precision’ than in the previous exercise. In fact, as the 
last two columns of the table demonstrate, the figures in panels (a) through (e) tend to be 
lower than the corresponding values observed for Britain in either 1998 or 2004 (again 
refer to Table 4a). We can mostly attribute this larger gap to differences in the mean of 
the  single establishment variable.  As a practical matter, replication of the last two 
columns purged of this variable yields a much smaller difference between observed and 
counterfactual coverage rates of roughly 3 percentage points. (Counterfactual results 
without the single-establishment dummy are available from the authors upon request.) In 
any event, note that the 1998-2004 percentage point changes reported in Table 5 are very 
much in line with the observed changes reported in Table 4a. Consequently, the main 
results are as follows: first, in both countries establishment behaviour changes very little 
through time; and, second, the two countries differ substantially in their behaviour for a 
given set of establishment characteristics. Vulgo: propensities by country mean 
everything in terms of cross-country differences in collective bargaining.




VI   CONCLUSIONS 
We have charted the incidence of and changes in collective bargaining between 1998 and 
2004, estimating a common model of the determinants of coverage for Germany and 
Britain, both severally and jointly. Ours is the first comparative study seeking to 
understand the factors behind the recent, substantial decline in private sector collective 
bargaining in Germany and Britain. Our treatment does four things.  First, it quantifies 
the extent of that decline at the level of the establishment. Second, it establishes the role 
of compositional change in establishment characteristics in contributing to this decline.
12 
Third, it considers the extent to which differences in establishment characteristics across 
Germany and Britain can account for the gap in the frequency of collective bargaining 
between the two countries. Finally, the results are supported in sensitivity analyses.   
We find evidence of a strong and persistent decline in collective bargaining in 
Germany and Britain since the late 1990s. By 2004, just over 50 percent of German 
establishments were covered by a collective agreement, down 11 percentage points on six 
years earlier.  At around 15 percent, the union recognition rate in Britain was less than 
one-third that of Germany, having fallen by over one-quarter in the previous six years.  
Projecting this 6-year rate of decline forward another six years to 2010 implies only 40 
percent of German private-sector establishments will be covered by any type of collective 
agreement while the rate in Britain will be around 10 percent.   
We have found that the decline in collective bargaining incidence in both 
countries is mostly due to changes in behaviour rather than to compositional effects.  This 
outcome is not particularly surprising since establishment characteristics have not 
changed that much over this relatively short time frame. Nevertheless, it is striking that  
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the decline is apparent in virtually every type of establishment, albeit to different degrees. 
There are few, if any, impregnable bastions of unionism left in these two nations.  
A comparison of establishment characteristics across Germany and Britain 
revealed a number of substantial differences, perhaps the most important of which was 
the much greater incidence of single independent establishments in the former country. 
The lower propensity of single-establishment firms to embrace collective bargaining 
compared with their multi-site counterparts suggests that the gap in collective bargaining 
between Germany and Britain might get even bigger if such differences were accounted 
for. Yet, compositional differences in establishment characteristics accounted for about 
one-tenth of the 40 percentage point gap in collective bargaining incidence between 
Germany and Britain. The rest, manifested in pooled country equations as a large 
coefficient estimate for the ‘Germany’ dummy, remains unexplained. But the British 
deficit is likely to capture country-level differences in history, culture and institutions, as 
well as some residual unobserved establishment-level factors. Interestingly, the size of 
the ‘Germany’ effect remained relatively stable over the period under investigation. 
Although the rate of union decline is faster in Britain than in Germany and began 
earlier, it is possible that the decline in Germany will unfold in much the same way as it 
has done in Britain. Unionization is traditionally well-established in the manufacturing 
sector, but the decline in unionization across all types of establishment and all industries 
suggests that the higher incidence of manufacturing in Germany relative to Britain is 
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1  We also considered the course of workplace representation in works councils 
(Germany) and joint consultative committees (Britain). Space constraints rule out 
presentation of this part of our analysis but results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
 
2 For a moment-in-time analysis of the determinants of ‘never membership’ in German 
trade unions, see Schnabel and Wagner (2006). 
 
3 Large plants are oversampled but the sampling within each cell is random. 
 
4 The German survey goes on to ask of those establishments not bound by a collective 
agreement whether or not they nevertheless orient themselves toward an industry-wide 
collective agreement. We do not exploit this potentially interesting distinction here. 
 
5 Once the survey interviewer has established that there is a union at the establishment the 
manager is asked: “Is the [NAME OF UNION]  recognized by management for 
negotiating pay and conditions for any sections of the workforce in this establishment? 
(INTERVIEWER: If agreements are negotiated with the union at a higher level in the 
organisation or by an employers association, but apply to union/staff association 
members here, count as recognized).” 
 
6 We do not implement a three-component decomposition which can be derived similarly 
to yield 
10 00 10 10 10 ()() () () t t tt tt t t t t t x xb xb b x x b b Δ =− + −+− −, where the third term is the 
interaction of the composition and within-group effects. Consistent with the literature, 
our assumption is that the third term is neglible.  
 
7 Similar regressions for the other outcome variables – any collective agreement for 
Britain, and sectoral- and firm-level agreements for both countries – are available on 
request. 
 
8 Although the extended set of regressors in Appendix Table 1 is limited to the addition 
of industry and regional controls in the case of Germany and regional and detailed  
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workforce composition controls in the case of Britain, there is a good reason for this: we 
seek to keep the specifications for the two countries as close as possible to facilitate 
comparisons between them. Also, in the interests of economy, the 1998 coefficients are 
the sole reference category used here (as is also true for Appendix Table 2).
 
 
9  See Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2010) for an insightful survey on Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition methods.  
 
10 Again, although the results show some sensitivity with respect to the selected reference 
group, the dominance of the between-effect in the case of firm-level agreements is pretty 
clear. 
 
11 As mentioned in the modeling section, there is no reason to suspect that the OLS 
simplification is flawed. However, as a final check, we report in Appendix Table 4 the 
results of fitting a probit model to the data. Again in the interests of economy we only 
replicate the case identified in Table 4a. It is apparent that there are virtually no 
differences between the two sets of estimates. 
 
12Interestingly, the only other study to use this establishment-based approach, and which 
covers a 24-year period of decline, recoups much the same percentage change attributable 
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1998 2004 p.p.c. p.c. 1998  2004 p.p.c.  p.c. 
Any collective agreement/union recognition   62.5  51.1 -11.4 -18.2 20.3  14.5  -5.8  -28.7 
Any collective agreement  62.5  51.1 -11.4 -18.2 16.9  10.6  -6.3  -37.2 
Sectoral-level agreement  56.9 47.1 -9.8  -17.2 4.2  1.8  -2.4 -57.2 
Firm-level agreement  5.6 4.0  -1.6  -28.5  8.3 7.7 -0.6 -7.4 
             
Manufacturing    25.8  21.4  -4.4  -17.1  17.6  14.4  -3.2  -18.2 
Utilities  0.4 0.7 0.3  72.1  0.2 0.2 -0.1  -26.2 
Construction 15.4  10.6  -4.8  -30.9  6.5  5.0  -1.5  -23.0 
Wholesale and retail trade  26.3  25.6  -0.7  -2.5  25.5  25.8  0.3  1.1 
Hotels and restaurants  6.6  6.7  0.1  1.2  10.6  11.0  0.4  4.2 
Transport and communications  5.6 6.7 1.1  20.2  5.3 5.3  0.0  0.8 
Financial services  0.9  1.8  0.9  91.4  12.9  13.5  0.6  4.6 
Other business services  11.3  16.1  4.8  42.0  5.7  7.3  1.5  26.7 
Education  0.9 0.9 0.0 1.5  2.9 1.3 -1.6  -54.9 
Health  4.8 6.5 1.7  36.4  3.8 4.2  0.4 10.4 
Community services  2.0  3.0  1.0  50.0  9.0  12.0  3.0  33.7 
Leading  region  74.2 81.7  7.6 10.2  29.2 25.8  -3.4 -11.7 
Size 10-20   58.8  56.3  -2.5  -4.3  52.8  51.5  -1.3  -2.5 
Size 21-100  34.6  36.5  1.9  5.5  38.6  40.6  2.0  5.1 
Size  101-200  3.8 4.2 0.4  11.9  5.1 4.5 -0.6  -11.7 
Size  201-499  2.1 2.3 0.2  11.7  2.7 2.6 -0.1 -4.4 
Size  500-999  0.4 0.5 0.1  13.6  0.6 0.6  0.0  3.4 
Size ≥1,  000  0.3 0.2 0.0  -4.0  0.2 0.2  0.0 -9.1 
Foreign owned  3.1  4.2  1.1  35.5  7.7  11.3  3.7  47.6 
Single establishment  81.3  77.9  -3.3 -4.1  40.2 38.1  -2.1  -5.2 
Establishment older than 10 years  69.7  77.6  7.8  11.2  66.9  72.9  6.0  8.9 
Proportion female workers  39.7  41.5  1.8  4.5  47.9  48.4  0.5  1.1 
Proportion part-time workers  21.8  20.3  -1.5  -6.7  28.6  30.4  1.8  6.4 
Proportion skilled workers  57.0  62.8  5.8  10.1  54.6  46.9  -7.7  -14.0 
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS 1998 and 2004.  
Notes: p.p.c. and p.c. denote percentage point change and percentage change in the mean values,                    
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1998  2004  p.p c.  1998  2004  p.p c. 
Manufacturing          56.7  44.9  -11.8  16.8  8.9  -7.9 
Utilities  96.8 73.3  -23.5  97.9 94.9  -3.0 
Construction 76.1  73.8  -2.3  24.2  9.4  -14.8 
Wholesale and retail trade  70.9  59.7  -11.2  14.7  9.8  -4.9 
Hotels and restaurants  85.4  66.3  -19.1  2.6  0.3  -2.3 
Transport and communications  77.1  55.4  -21.7  33.5  19.6  -13.9 
Financial  services  81.2 79.4  -1.8  24.8 33.1  8.3 
Other business services  23.8  24.0  0.2   6.3  1.7  -4.6 
Education  30.7 33.3  2.6  43.8 26.1  -17.7 
Health  41.1 33.5  -7.6  31.2 11.7  -19.5 
Community  services  78.5 34.0  -44.5  9.9 14.5  4.6 
Leading  region  68.2 54.7  -13.5  12.7 11.0  -1.7 
Size 10-20              56.2  49.2  -7.0  33.1  21.3  -11.8 
Size  21-100  68.4 56.5  -11.9  19.4 16.3  -3.1 
Size  101-200  81.3 65.2  -16.1  38.8 36.8  -2 
Size  201-499  78.8 78.0  -0.8  54.8 48.3  -6.5 
Size  500-999  94.8 88.5  -6.3  61.4 43.8  -17.6 
Size ≥1000  98.5 95.0  -3.5  66.6 61.1  -5.5 
Foreign  owned  61.8 53.3  -8.5  15.8 14.2  -1.6 
Single establishment  59.9  46.9  -13  12.4  4.8  -7.6 
Establishment older than 10 years  67.9  54.2  -13.7  19.8  16.7  -3.1 
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS 1998 and 2004.  
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Germany Britain Pooled  data 
1998 and 2004  1998  2004  1998 and 2004  1998  2004  1998 and 2004  1998  2004 
Utilities  0.230 ***  0.317 ***  0.182 ***  0.566 ***  0.500  *** 0.634  *** 0.288  *** 0.376  *** 0.242  *** 
(0.046)   (0.061)   (0.053)   (0.048)   (0.073)   (0.062)   (0.042)   (0.057)   (0.053)   
Construction  0.294 ***  0.276 ***  0.312 ***  -0.540   -0.073   -0.051   0.162 ***  0.149 ***  0.174 *** 
(0.031)   (0.047)   (0.035)   (0.064)   (0.116)   (0.049)   (0.033)   (0.057)   (0.031)   
Wholesale  and  retail  trade  0.114 ***  0.147 ***  0.082 **  -0.197 ***  -0.220 ***  -0.171 ***  -0.012   -0.001   -0.020  
(0.032)   (0.051)   (0.035)   (0.425)   (0.073)   (0.412)   (0.027)   (0.046)   (0.027)   
Hotels  and  restaurants  0.275 ***  0.320 ***  0.226 ***  -0.296 ***  -0.379  *** -0.234  *** -0.028    -0.018    -0.032   
(0.049)   (0.075)   (0.059)   (0.047)   (0.086)   (0.043)   (0.036)   (0.062)   (0.036)   
Transport and 
communications 
0.127 ***  0.214 ***  0.061   -0.159   -0.003   -0.033   0.065 *  0.012 *  0.027  
(0.041)   (0.059)   (0.049)   (0.065)   (0.117)   (0.056)   (0.037)   (0.067)   (0.036)   
Financial  services  0.192 ***  0.181   0.186 ***  0.225   -0.076   0.114 **  0.095 **  0.024   0.148 *** 
(0.060)   (0.110)   (0.062)   (0.051)   (0.083)   (0.056)   (0.040)   (0.065)   (0.045)   
Other  business  services  -0.257 ***  -0.314 ***  -0.232 ***  -0.216  ***  -0.268  *** -0.162  *** -0.263  *** -0.311  *** -0.230  *** 
(0.033)   (0.061)   (0.032)   (0.044)   (0.080)   (0.040)   (0.029)   (0.053)   (0.027)   
Education  -0.167 *  0.160   -0.185 **  0.087   0.121   0.025   0.015   0.072   -0.058  
(0.097)   (0.187)   (0.086)   (0.105)   (0.152)   (0.095)   (0.087)   (0.145)   (0.064)   
Health  -0.140 **  -0.142   -0.151 **  -0.045   0.031   -0.096   -0.104 **  -0.055   -0.137 *** 
(0.067)   (0.129)   (0.063)   (0.073)   (0.134)   (0.062)   (0.052)   (0.102)   (0.046)   
Community  services  0.000   0.261 ***  -0.137 **  -0.127 **  -0.202  **  -0.069   -0.045   -0.052   -0.040   
(0.066)   (0.090)   (0.060)   (0.050)   (0.080)   (0.056)   (0.036)   (0.059)   (0.040)   
Leading  region  0.211 ***  0.231 ***  0.197 ***  -0.072 ***  -0.101 ***  -0.061 ***  0.050 ***  0.056 **  0.045 *** 
(0.019)   (0.033)   (0.020)   (0.019)   (0.034)   (0.022)   (0.015)   (0.026)   (0.016)    
 
 
Size  21-100  0.102 ***  0.098 ***  0.101 ***  0.030   0.005   0.061 **  0.069 ***  0.062 **  0.078 *** 
(0.019)   (0.031)   (0.022)   (0.024)   (0.042)   (0.024)   (0.016)   (0.029)   (0.017)   
Size101-200  0.206 ***  0.219 ***  0.186 ***  0.183 ***  0.165  *** 0.208  *** 0.202  *** 0.217  *** 0.195  *** 
(0.025)   (0.038)   (0.030)   (0.034)   (0.533)   (0.044)   (0.022)   (0.035)   (0.028)   
Size  201-499  0.271 ***  0.217 ***  0.303 ***  0.302 ***  0.294  *** 0.321  *** 0.306  *** 0.295  *** 0.321  *** 
(0.028)   (0.048)   (0.029)   (0.034)   (0.055)   (0.043)   (0.023)   (0.039)   (0.027)   
Size  500-999  0.406 ***  0.343 ***  0.421 ***  0.296 ***  0.355  *** 0.265  *** 0.364  *** 0.400  *** 0.343  *** 
(0.028)   (0.041)   (0.035)   (0.043)   (0.069)   (0.054)   (0.028)   (0.044)   (0.035)   
Size ≥1000  0.386 ***  0.321 ***  0.424 ***  0.402 ***  0.399  *** 0.414  *** 0.400  *** 0.384  *** 0.419  *** 
(0.027)   (0.043)   (0.031)   (0.049)   (0.081)   (0.063)   (0.030)   (0.051)   (0.035)   
Foreign  owned  -0.113 ***  -0.134   -0.104 **  -0.104 ***  -0.149 ***  -0.067 **  -0.110 ***  -0.155 ***  -0.086 *** 
(0.041)   (0.082)   (0.041)   (0.027)   (0.046)   (0.032)   (0.024)   (0.041)   (0.027)   
Single  establishment  -0.120 ***  -0.084 **  -0.148 ***  -0.162 ***  -0.174 ***  -0.139 ***  -0.135 ***  -0.127 ***  -0.137 *** 
(0.041)   (0.035)   (0.025)   (0.024)   (0.043)   (0.023)   (0.018)   (0.033)   (0.018)   
Establishment older than 
10 years 
0.085 ***  0.093 **  0.076 ***  0.023   -0.016   0.069 ***  0.065 ***  0.056 *  0.077 *** 
(0.025)   (0.042)   (0.029)   (0.027)   (0.048)   (0.022)   (0.019)   (0.033)   (0.018)   
Proportion  female  workers  0.027   0.045   0.023   -0.016   -0.072   0.026   0.050   0.056   0.053  
(0.048)   (0.084)   (0.052)   (0.052)   (0.095)   (0.050)   (0.036)   (0.068)   (0.036)   
Proportion part-time 
workers 
0.012   -0.091   0.069   0.084 *  0.122   0.053   0.000   -0.044   0.031  
(0.057)   (0.097)   (0.063)   (0.051)   (0.095)   (0.050)   (0.039)   (0.073)   (0.040)   
Proportion  skilled  workers  0.103 ***  0.073   0.110 **  -0.046   -0.002   -0.080 *  0.000   0.004   0.000  
(0.037)   (0.057)   (0.044)   (0.041)   (0.069)   (0.044)   (0.029)   (0.049)   (0.032)   
Time  dummy  (2004)  -0.124 ***          -0.056 **          -0.081 ***        
(0.019)           (0.022)           (0.015)          
German  establishment                       0.435  ***  0.453  ***  0.422  *** 




Constant  0.320 ***  0.293 ***  0.238 ***  0.363 ***  0.443  *** 0.216  *** 0.153  *** 0.154  *  0.059   
(0.049)     (0.075)     (0.056)     (0.074)     (0.120)     (0.057)     (0.048)     (0.084)     0.0398    
Obs. 10,686  3,552  7,134  2,991  1,502 1,489  13,677  7,134 8,623 
R
2  0.20 0.22 0.18 0.17  0.18  0.19  0.27  0.18  0.26 
 
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS 1998 and 2004.  
Notes: *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ‘Manufacturing’ and ‘Size 10-20’ are the reference industry 
and employment size categories, respectively.  
 
Table 4a 
Within versus compositional change in Germany and Britain by type of agreement, 
weighted data, 1998 and 2004  (in percentage) 
 
   Germany 
 
Britain 
    1998 
 
2004 1998 2004 
  (a) Collective agreement of any type/union recognition       
(1)  Observed coverage rate (%)  62.5  51.1  20.3  14.5 
(2)  Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -11.4    -5.8 









(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 







(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour based 







(7)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 







(8)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour based 







  (b) Collective agreement of any type             
(1)  Observed coverage rate (%)  62,5  51.1  16.9  10.6 
(2)  Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -11.4    -6.3 









(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 







(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour based 







(7)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 







(8)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour based 









  (c) Sectoral-level agreement             
(1)  Observed coverage rate (%)  56.9  47.1  4.2  1.8 
(2)  Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -9.8    -2.4 









(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 







(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 







(7)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 







(8)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 







  (d) Firm-level agreement             
(1)  Observed coverage rate (%)  5.6  4.0  8.3  7.7 
(2)  Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -1.6    -0.6 









(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 







(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 







(7)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 









Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 
based on 2004 coefficients 
   -1.7 
(0.008) 
104.4% 




Source: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS, 1998 and 2004. 
Notes: For each panel, row (3) is given by [x_04*b_98] and row (4) by [x_98*b_04]; row (5), the 
between-effect, is given by [(x_04 – x_98)*b_98], or row (3) minus row (1) in 1998, while row (6), 
the within-effect, is given by [x_04*(b_04 – b_98)], or row (2) minus row (4). Finally, row (7) is 
given by [(x_04 – x_98)*b_04] and row (8) by [x_98*(b_04 – b_98)]. x denotes the observed mean 




Within versus compositional change by type of agreement and by year, weighted data, 





(a) Collective agreement of any type/union recognition  Germany  Britain  Germany  Britain 
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  62.5  20.3  51.1  14.5 
(2) Percentage point gap (Germany-Britain)    42.2    36.6 









(5) Percentage point gap due to differences in 







(6) Percentage point gap due to changes in behaviour 







(7) Percentage point gap due to differences in 









(8) Percentage point gap due to changes in behaviour 









       
(b) Collective agreement of any type             
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  62.5  16.9  51.1  10.6 
(2) Percentage point gap (Germany-Britain)    45.6    40.5 























(7) Percentage point gap due to differences in 









(8) Percentage point gap due to changes in behaviour 












(c) Sectoral-level agreement             
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  56.9  4.2  47.1  1.8 
(2) Percentage point gap (Germany-Britain)    52.8    45.4 























(7) Percentage point gap due to differences in 









(8) Percentage point gap due to changes in behaviour 









(d)Firm -level agreement             
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  5.6  8.3  4.0  7.7 
(2) Percentage point gap (Germany-Britain)    -2.8    -3.7 























(7) Percentage point gap due to differences in 









(8) Percentage point gap due to changes in behaviour 










Notes: For each panel, row (3) is given by x_B*b_G, while rows (5) and (6) are given by  
(x_G – x_B)*b_G (the between-effect) and x_B*(b_G –- b_B) (the within-effect), respectively; 
In turn, row (4) is given by x_G*b_B, while rows (7) and (8) are given by (x_G – x_B)*b_B (the 
between-effect) and x_G*(b_G –- b_B) (the within-effect).  B and G denote Britain and Germany; x 
denotes the observed mean characteristics; and b gives the estimated coefficients in the 
corresponding year. See equation (5) in the text. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
 
Table 5 
Counterfactual coverage rates in Germany and Britain 
 
 German  propensities  with 
British characteristics 
 
British propensities with 
German characteristics  
1998 2004 1998  2004 
       
(a)Collective agreement of any type/union recognition       
(1) Counterfactual coverage rate (%)  59.2  46.9  9.9  2.6 
(2) Percentage point decline (2004-1998)    -12.3    -7.3 
        
(b) Collective agreement of any type             
(1) Counterfactual coverage rate (%)  59.2  46.9  7.6  3.0 
(2) Percentage point decline (2004-1998)    -12.3    -4.6 
        
(c) Sectoral-level agreement             
(1) Counterfactual coverage rate (%)  51.0  40.3  1.5  0.7 
(2) Percentage point decline (2004-1998)    -10.7    -0.8 
        
(d) Firm-level agreement             
(1) Counterfactual coverage rate (%)  8.2  6.7  1.6  1.8 
(2) Percentage point decline (2004-1998)    -1.6    0.2 
        
Notes: In each panel, the counterfactual coverage rate in the first and second columns is given by 
x_B*b_G and x_G*b_B, respectively; B and G denote Britain and Germany; x denotes the observed 
mean characteristics; and b gives the estimated coefficients in the corresponding year.  
 
Appendix Table 1 
Within versus compositional change in Germany and Britain, weighted data, 1998 and 2004, full specification  
 
  Collective agreement of any 
type /union recognition 
 
  Sectoral agreement  Firm-level agreement 
   1998 2004      1998 2004      1998  2004     
Germany                 
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  62.5 51.8    56.9 47.8    5.6  4.0   
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -10.7     -9.1     -1.6  
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients    65.0     59.5     5.5  
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics    2.5 (-23.6%)    2.6 (-28.6%)    -0.1  (4.4%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour      -13.3  (123.6%)     -11.8  (128.6%)     -1.5  (95.6%) 
Britain                 
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  19.7  14.6   4.2  1.8   8.2  7.7  
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -5.1     -2.4     -0.5   
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients    17.6     3.2     8.4   
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics    -2.2 (41.9%)    -1.0 (39.3%)    0.2  (-34.7%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour     -2.98 (58.1%)    -1.5 (60.7%)    -0.7  (134.7%) 
 
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS, 1998 and 2004. 
Notes: See notes to Table 4a. The model includes an extended set of industry and regional dummies for Germany and in the case of Britain 
detailed regional and workforce composition dummies.  
 
   
   
Appendix Table 2 
Within versus compositional change in Germany and Britain by type of agreement, 





 1998  2004  1998  2004 
       
(a) Collective agreement of any type/union recognition         
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  69.3  57.7  39.1  33.6 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -11.6    -5.5 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients    70.3    37.9 








(b) Collective agreement of any type           
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  69.3  57.7  35.0  28.0 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -11.6    -7.0 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients    70.3    33.9 








(c) Sectoral-level agreement         
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  58.3  48.8  5.4  4.9 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -9.5    -0.5 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients    61.5    4.8 








(d) Firm-level agreement         
(1) Observed coverage rate (%)  11.0  9.0  26.3  22.1 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -2.0    -4.2 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients    8.8    25.4 









Notes: See notes to Table 4a. 
 
  
   
 
Appendix Table 3a 
Detailed decomposition by individual variables, Germany, 1998-2004 
  
Reference group:  1998 coefficients  2004 coefficients  Pooled 
     
(a) Collective agreement of any 
type/union recognition 
   
Mean coverage difference 
between 2004 and 1998 (%)  
-11.4 (0.020)  -11.4 (0.020) -11.4  (0.020) 
     
Composition effects due to:     
Industrial sector  -0.024 (0.010)    -0.027 (0.007)    -0.025 (0.008)   
Establishment size  0.004 (0.002)  0.004 (0.002)    0.004 (0.002)   
Leading region  0.018 (0.003)    0.015 (0.003)    0.016 (0.003)   
Foreign owned   -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001) 
Single establishment   0.003 (0.002)  0.005 (0.002)  0.004 (0.002) 
Establish. older than 10 years  0.007 (0.004)  0.006 (0.003)  0.007 (0.003) 
Proportion female workers  0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.001) 
Proportion part-time workers  0.001 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001) 
Proportion skilled workers   0.004 (0.003)  0.006 (0.003)  0.006 (0.003) 
(Total, in percentage)  +1.2 (0.011)  +0.7 (0.009)  +1.0 (0.009) 
     
Within effects due to:     
Industrial sector  -0.030 (0.038)    -0.026 (0.035)    -0.029 (0.036)   
Establishment size  0.002 (0.015)    0.002 (0.015)    0.002 (0.015)   
Leading region  -0.028 (0.030)    -0.025 (0.027)  -0.026 (0.028)   
Foreign owned   0.001 (0.004)  0.001 (0.003)  0.001 (0.003) 
Single establishment   -0.050 (0.033)  -0.052 (0.034)  -0.051 (0.033) 
Establish. older than 10 years  -0.013 (0.039)  -0.012 (0.035)  -0.013 (0.037) 
Proportion female workers  -0.009 (0.040)  -0.009 (0.039)  -0.009 (0.040) 
Proportion part-time workers  0.033 (0.023)  0.035 (0.025)  0.034 (0.024) 
Proportion skilled workers   0.023 (0.045)  0.021 (0.041)  0.022 (0.043) 
Constant -0.055  (0.092)  -0.055 (0.092)  -0.055 (0.092) 
(Total, in percentage)  -12.6 (0.019)  -12.0 (0.019)  -12.4 (0.019) 
     
Notes: In columns (1) and (2), we use 1998 and 2004 coefficients, respectively. In column (3), we use an 


















Δ= − + − ∑ , where  0 B b and  0 B b denote the constant in each group’s model. 
A and B stand for countries (Germany and Britain)  or time (1998 and 2004). Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. 
  
   
Appendix Table 3b 
Detailed decomposition by individual variables, Britain, 1998-2004 
  
Reference group:  1998 coefficients  2004 coefficients  Pooled 
     
(a) Collective agreement of any 
type/union recognition 
   
Mean coverage difference 
between 2004 and 1998 (%) 
-5.8 (0.024)  -5.8 (0.024)  -5.8 (0.024) 
     
Composition effects due to:     
Industrial sector  -0.014 (0.010)    -0.002 (0.008)    -0.010 (0.008)   
Establishment size  -0.001 (0.002)    -0.001 (0.001)    -0.001 (0.002)   
Leading region  0.003 (0.003)    0.002 (0.002)    0.002 (0.002)   
Foreign owned   -0.005 (0.003)  -0.002 (0.002)  -0.004 (0.002) 
Single establishment   0.004 (0.006)  0.003 (0.005)  0.004 (0.006) 
Establish. older than 10 years  -0.001 (0.003)  0.004 (0.003)  0.001 (0.002) 
Proportion female workers  -0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.001) 
Proportion part-time workers  0.002 (0.003)  0.001 (0.001)  0.002 (0.002) 
Proportion skilled workers   0.001 (0.001)  0.006 (0.004)  0.003 (0.003) 
(Total, in percentage)  -1.3 (0.012)  +0.8 (0.010)  -0.3 (0.010) 
     
Within effects due to:     
Industrial sector  0.071 (0.069    0.063 (0.066)    0.067 (0.068)   
Establishment size  0.025 (0.023    0.024 (0.022)    0.025 (0.022)   
Leading region  0.010 (0.010    0.012 (0.012)    0.011 (0.011)   
Foreign owned   0.009 (0.006  0.006 (0.004)  0.008 (0.005) 
Single establishment   0.013 (0.019  0.014 (0.020)  0.014 (0.019) 
Establish. older than 10 years  0.062 (0.039  0.057 (0.036)  0.060 (0.037) 
Proportion female workers  0.047 (0.052  0.047 (0.052)  0.047 (0.052) 
Proportion part-time workers  -0.021 (0.033  -0.020 (0.031)  -0.020 (0.031) 
Proportion skilled workers   -0.037 (0.038  -0.043 (0.045)  -0.040 (0.042) 
Constant -0.227  (0.133  -0.227 (0.133)  -0.227 (0.133) 
(Total, in percentage)  -4.6 (0.022)  -6.6 (0.023)  -5.6 (0.022) 
     
Note: See notes to Appendix Table 3a. 
   
   
Appendix Table 4 
Within-versus compositional change in Germany and Britain by type of agreement, 
weighted data, probit estimates, 1998 and 2004 
 
   Germany 
 
Britain 
    1998 2004 1998 2004 
        
  (a) Collective agreement of any type/union recognition      
(1)  Observed coverage rate (%)  62.5  51.1  20.3  14.5 
(2)  Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -11.4    -5.8 









(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 





(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 





(7)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 





(8)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 





  (b) Collective agreement of any type             
(1)  Observed coverage rate (%)  62.5  51.1  16.9  10.6 
(2)  Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -11.4    -6.3 









(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 





(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 





(7)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 





(8)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 






   
 
 
 (c) Sectoral-level agreement             
(1)  Observed coverage rate (%)  56.9  47.1  4.2  1.8 
(2)  Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -9.8    -2.4 









(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 





(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 





(7)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 





(8)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 





  (d) Firm-level agreement             
(1)  Observed coverage rate (%)  5.6  4.0  8.3  7.7 
(2)  Percentage point change, 1998-2004    -1.6    -0.6 









(5)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 





(6)  Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 





(7)  Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 







Percentage point change due to changes in behaviour 
based on 2004 coefficients 
   -1.6 
(100.6%) 
   -1.3 
(211.3%) 
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